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Q ualia are layered and complex, a labyrinth of a concept, rife with debate as to their 
existence, state, and what they mean 
for our understanding of knowledge, 
relationship with the world, and 
ourselves. Thoughtful exploration into 
the complexities of what qualia are 
and how they relate to the mind-body 
problem will be wrestled with though 
research applied within this paper. 
Qualia can be found in philosophical 
debates surrounding epistemology 
and in branches across the spectrum, 
from Rene Descartes to Simone de 
Beauvoir. While not mentioned by 
name, the concept of qualia has played 
a large part in philosophy’s quest to 
understand humanity, and by extension, 
to understand others who share our 
humanity. In our current culture of 
increasingly polarized political, racial, 
gendered, and cultural views, qualia are 
a concept that can shed light and insight 
for better understanding of those whose 
experience is fundamentally different 
from our own. Qualia offer a description 
to the nature of experience, and can offer 
a new way of understanding the barriers 
and divides between individuals. 
Understanding can break down the 
walls of fear that fuel divides, and qualia 
are one way to bring understanding into 
a world desperate for more. 
 In this paper, we will go over 
the basic philosophic understanding 
of qualia today. We will see how 
consciousness is necessary for qualia, 
and why this makes defining qualia 
a challenge. Next, we will go over the 
explanatory gap of qualia. From there, 
we will see how qualia relate to the mind-
body problem, and the early exploration 
of this problem through Descartes, 
Locke, and Berkeley. Additionally, we 
will go over the main schools of thought 
that surround the mind-body problem: 
materialism, idealism, and dualism. 
These schools cover a spectrum of 
views on the mind-body problem and 
offer solutions based on their respective 
frameworks. However, we will find 
that materialism and idealism fail to 
present a compelling solution to the 
mind-body problem, nor a framework 
that sustains qualia. Dualism, on the 
other hand, offers a framework that can 
better support solutions to the mind-
body problem and qualia. Then, we 
will look at some more contemporary 
understandings of the senses and 
qualia’s relationship to the mind-body 
problem. The goal of this paper is to give 
a general overview of qualia, the mind-
body problem, and the various solutions 
philosophical schools offer. Ultimately, 
we will see how qualia and the mind-
body problem relate to one another 
and gain a deeper understanding of the 
various views that surround these two 
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 Let us start with qualia. Qualia 
come out of consciousness and are 
related to experience and the senses. 
Thomas Nagel explains qualia very 
concisely in his paper What is it like 
to be a bat? “the fact that an organism 
has conscious experience at all means, 
basically, that there is something it is like 
to be that organism” (436). Qualia, as is 
reiterated again and again throughout 
discussion, is that they encapsulate the 
quality of to-be-like something. When 
an individual experiences anything, 
there is a particular quality unique to 
the experience for that individual. This 
intrinsic nature of quale and experience 
is one of the main origins for its divisive 
and uncertain inquiry. But, there is a 
general consensus that consciousness 
is a requirement for qualia. 
 Like qualia, consciousness 
is not well understood in scientific 
terms nor agreed upon philosophically. 
Exactly what constitutes consciousness 
and what it is, is uncertain. This makes 
it particularly difficult to define qualia, 
since they rely on consciousness. 
However, it is agreed that humans have 
consciousness. This assumption is vital 
in any discussion on ethics, and for 
the most part, epistemology as well. 
So, understanding that consciousness 
exists, and humans have it, we can move 
forward.
 Qualia come out of our 
consciousness, they “are intrinsic to 
their subjects” (Byrne and Tye 241) 
that is, there is no way for us to fully 
separate qualia from our experiences. 
As conscious creatures, our experiences 
in the world have “characters or 
qualities that consist of something it is 
like for conscious subjects to be in such 
states” (Wright 90). What this means 
for us, is that our nature as conscious 
beings allow qualia to be intrinsic to our 
experience. Furthermore, since qualia 
are intrinsic to our experience, it is clear 
that they originate from mind. One way 
to illustrate qualia is the classic black-
and-white room example: 
Mary is raised in a black and 
white room in which she learns 
all the cognitive and functional 
facts about color vision. When 
she ventures outside that room 
for the first time, she learns (upon 
perceiving a ripe red tomato) a new 
fact about color vision, something 
she was not able to infer from her 
knowledge of the cognitive and 
functional aspects of color-vision. 
“This is what it is like to see red,” 
she might think to herself. “I didn’t 
know what that was like before”. 
(Wright 92-93)
 Mary learned all she could, 
all of the facts about color and vision. 
But this is unable to give her qualia, 
since it does not arise from her sensory 
experience. She only knows what it is 
like because she experiences it, and this 
“what it is like” is required for qualia.
 This also brings us to another 
one of qualia’s slippery traits, the 
explanatory gap. Mary might have read 
someone’s account of seeing read, and 
she herself might try to articulate what 
seeing red it like. However, she will fail. 
To further illustrate this idea, take this 
example; you and I both look at the same 
swatch of the colour orange. Do you 
see the same exact colour as I? Maybe. 
There is no way for either of us to be 
sure, we can only speculate and attempt 
to describe our understanding of our 
own experience. But can words clearly 
37
Allison Mangan
convey the essence of our experience 
as we experience it? Doubtful. It seems 
likely or inevitable that, both of us have 
different qualia of this experience. If 
we perceive the same colour, it might 
prompt a different emotion, or thought, 
and certainly present you with a 
different experience than myself.
 As we can see, qualia have a 
level of ineffability. “These experiences 
have in each case a specific subjective 
character, which it is beyond our ability 
to conceive” (Nagel 439). Whether the 
organism in question is a bat or a fellow 
human, qualia cannot be fully explained 
or understood by another. This may be 
due to the unique physiology behind our 
eyes, skin, muscles, neurons, and brain. 
While we may have the same basic 
physiology, these are still unique to the 
individual, since no one experiences the 
world through their senses the same 
as another (as far as we know). But, 
beyond the senses, this explanatory 
gap can also be due to our individual 
mental worlds: past experiences, biases, 
thoughts, and feelings about what we 
are experiencing. Most likely, it is due to 
both. 
 Because of the explanatory 
gap, qualia cannot be easily described or 
explained. Even a single event, a single 
quale, cannot be accurately described 
to another person. Rather, as we saw 
with Mary, qualia are tied to experience; 
qualia arise from experience and 
consciousness. This experience does 
not rely solely on external objects, while 
they may prompt internal phenomena, 
qualia are reliant on the subject’s 
conscious experience and intrinsic 
internal mechanisms that allow qualia 
to be generated. This relationship 
between qualia, which require the 
mind, but also rest in some capacity on 
sensations, is what will be explored in 
the mind-body problem. 
 The mind-body problem is 
the general topic of how the mind (i.e. 
thoughts, emotions, experiences) relates 
to the physical realm (i.e. the senses, 
external stimuli). This problem arose 
as we understand it today during the 
Enlightenment period, when there was 
a general optimism in the humanity’s 
ability to know and trust in the senses. 
René Descartes and George Berkeley 
are two prominent writers from this 
period, whose work was impacted by 
the issue of qualia through the mind-
body problem. This is largely because 
in order for us to give substantial stock 
to scientific inquiry, which is solely 
based on our theory and observations, 
we must also be secure in the reliability 
of the senses and the physical world. 
This line of thought naturally led to the 
question of how the physical aspects 
of existence relate to the internal ones. 
Materialism attempts to answer this 
question.
 Materialism is a school of 
thought that offers a framework for 
dealing with the mind-body problem. 
In terms of the philosophy of the mind, 
it is “the view that the mind is the 
brain and that mental states are brain 
states. Mind and brain are one and 
the same-- they are identical” (Mandik 
77). Thoughts, feelings, consciousness, 
and everything that constitutes the 
mind can be reduced to purely physical 
phenomena. One of the implications 
of this framework is that qualia must 
be rejected. As we have distinguished 
qualia, they have a “what it is like” 
quality that emerges from conscious 
experience. Qualia have no physical 
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manifestation, rather they are a non-
material property. Therefore, qualia 
are irreducible to a purely physical 
phenomena. This idea of a non-material 
mental property is contradictory to 
materialism’s framework. Thus, it cannot 
be accepted in materialism. A major 
issue that surrounds materialism is the 
question of consciousness; it is not until 
more recent years that consciousness 
has been contested to be solely a 
physical object. Most concerningly, in 
materialist circles, there is debate as to 
whether consciousness exists (Ramsey). 
If it does, consciousness must be purely 
physical, and therefore can be localized 
within the human mind. However, there 
is no consensus within neurology, nor 
philosophy, that this is the case.  
 On the surface it would seem 
that materialism offers the best solution 
to the mind-body problem, since there is 
no separation between the mind and the 
body, there is no issue with reconciling 
the two. However, in order to have this 
solution, there are assumptions, logical 
leaps, and concessions that must be 
made. Firstly, we have to assume that 
everything in the mind is material, and 
concede that consciousness either does 
not exist, or that it is reducible to physical 
phenomena. The main implication of 
this, is that humans become reducible 
beings. Humanity’s reducibility does 
not seem capable of being reduced 
to only physical phenomena. As of 
yet, materialism has been unable to 
account for the subjective qualities of 
experience (Agius 102; Stoljar), and 
this is exactly what qualia accomplish. 
Overall, the materialist framework fails 
to adequately deal with complex ideas 
of the mind, and, other than outright 
rejection, is incapable of finding 
solutions to non-material concepts. 
 Descartes, and particularly 
Berkeley, sit away from materialism in 
their epistemological queries. Both of 
these philosophers offer insight into 
how qualia have been an unnamed, but 
central part in the mind-body problem. 
Before delving into Descartes, let us 
look at Berkeley’s idealism.
 Idealism, like materialism, 
has a range of viewpoints, but at its 
core it is the antithesis of materialism. 
While materialism reduces everything 
to material substance, idealism brings 
everything back to the mind, “according 
to idealism, everything is either a mind 
or something that depends on the mind” 
(Mandik 45). Berkeley is the epitome of 
idealism thought; in his metaphysics, 
there is only the mind, and the external 
world that we perceive, originates from 
it. Idealism as a whole would be able 
to accept qualia as a concept, but in 
Berkeley’s philosophy this does not 
seem to be the case: 
All our ideas, sensations, or the 
things which we perceive, by 
whatsoever names they may be 
distinguished, are visibly inactive--
there is nothing of power or agency 
included in them. So that one 
idea or object of thought cannot 
produce or make any alteration 
in another. To be satisfied of the 
truth of this, there is nothing else 
requisite but a bare observation of 
our ideas. For since they and every 
part of them exist only in the mind, 
it follows that there is nothing in 
them but what is perceived; but 
whoever shall attend to his ideas, 
whether of sense or reflection, will 
not perceive in them any power 
or activity; there is, therefore, no 
39
Allison Mangan
such thing contained in them. 
(Berkeley 173)
 To unpack this viewpoint a 
little, let us look at the first claim; that 
ideas, sensations and things perceived 
are inactive. This goes against the idea 
that the sensations and perception 
have no power, this would indicate 
that qualia are not possible. But it is 
understood that qualia are a type of 
activity that relate intrinsically to our 
experience. 
 As we have established, qualia 
are unique to an individual’s experience 
and subjective to their owner. Qualia 
are an active quality of ideas and 
sensations, which Berkeley claims 
are inactive. Qualia are intrinsically 
intentional, and this directly 
contradicts Berkeley’s conception of 
what ideas and internal phenomena are 
capable of (Wright 92). Furthermore, 
in Berkeley’s metaphysics (which are 
inseparable from his epistemology) the 
mind is the only thing we can know. The 
external world is forever covered with 
doubt, and therefore, not “real” in the 
same sense as the mind; it is the mind 
that can account for reality. With the 
external world being unknowable, and 
the internal world being the only aspect 
we can know, qualia seem to pose a 
bit of a problem. Since the senses and 
experience are both required, at least 
in part, for qualia to arise, the concept 
of qualia partially rests on the need for 
material substance. 
 Like materialism, idealism 
gives a simple answer to the mind-body 
problem, particularly in Berkeley. Since 
there is no material world, the body is 
simply a product of the mind. So, there is 
nothing to reconcile between the mind 
and the body. But, in recent years there 
has been less enthusiasm for idealism. 
Since it is quite difficult to completely 
reject the idea of material substance. 
Unless we accept idealism, the mind-
body problem is still a question to be 
tackled. 
 While Berkeley is the poster 
child for idealism, Descartes is the 
father of dualism (Baker 11; Mandik 16). 
Since Descartes originally pushed the 
mind-body problem to the frontlines of 
philosophical thought, his account of 
dualism has been shown to have several 
issues with its argumentation, or lack 
thereof. Nevertheless, his philosophy 
is important to understand in order to 
have a firmer grasp on the mind-body 
problem and the qualia that come with 
it. In Descartes’ philosophy, our internal 
mind is where we can begin with 
knowledge “so, my knowledge of my 
thought is more basic and more certain 
than my knowledge of any corporeal 
thing” (8). Our internal world is the 
most knowable aspect of existence to 
us. This is where idealism would stop, 
but Descartes endeavors to merge the 
physical with the immaterial through 
dualism. 
 To oversimplify dualism, 
it is the idea that the mind and the 
body/brain are two distinct things 
(Mandik 16). In Descartes, these two 
are completely separate and distinct 
from one another. The main question 
Descartes’s dualism produces is if these 
two are separate, how do they interact? 
While we are not going to try to answer 
this question here, we will look at how 
qualia fit into the bigger picture of 
dualism. “Just as the physical world is 
‘populated’ by physical objects (tables, 
chairs, human bodies), the mental 
world is ‘populated’ by mental objects 
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(mental events and states). Space is 
occupied by corporeal things, the mind 
by incorporeal things” (Baker 12). We 
can see from Baker’s description of 
dualism that qualia, which are classified 
as a “mental state”, fit nicely into both 
Descartes’ dualism and dualism as a 
whole. 
 So, Descartes and Berkeley 
sit along this gradient of accepting the 
mind before moving out to explore 
the external world. Berkeley rejects 
the idea that we can know of external 
objects through our senses, due to 
how the senses and ideas relate to 
consciousness and perception. We do 
find, however, that Berkeley and Locke 
sit on similar sides of the mind-body 
debate, in regards to how qualia impact 
our understanding of the mind-body 
problem. 
 In Berkeley’s first four sentences 
of section 25 in  Treatise Concerning 
Human Knowledge, he goes over a 
summary of how he finds perception 
relates to ideas and sensations. Berkeley 
holds that the senses are indeed, the 
start of our perception, agreeing with 
Locke that we must gain our knowledge 
from some external source. Locke and 
Berkeley assert that this external source 
comes through our senses, and from 
there to our perception. From this, we 
form ideas and concepts, which we 
perceive. Bridging this gap between the 
senses and our experience of them has 
long been central to our understanding 
of the mind-body question.
 Locke’s view of the mind-
body problem is that perception is 
twofold, requiring both external input 
and the internal workings of the mind. 
This distinction is important for the 
formation of ideas and how perception 
operates within ourselves. The senses 
are necessary for our perception to 
take place. Perception, the first faculty 
of the mind, makes it the threshold for 
our understanding and knowledge. 
According to Locke, the mind is passive 
in regards to perception, and sensation 
influences perception. Just as we can’t 
help but taste or feel, we cannot help but 
perceive sensory input. Thus, in Locke, 
with one’s perception so enwrapped in 
the senses, qualia are an aspect of the 
lived experience. 
Perception, as it is the first faculty 
of the mind, exercised about our 
ideas; so it is the first and simplest 
idea we have from reflection, 
and is by some called thinking in 
general. Though thinking, in the 
propriety of the English tongue, 
signifies that sort of operation in 
the mind about its ideas, wherein 
the mind is active; where it, with 
some degree of voluntary attention 
considers any thing. For in bare 
naked perception, the mind is, for 
the most part, only passive; and 
what it perceives, it cannot avoid 
perceiving…
whatever alterations are made 
in the body, if they reach not the 
mind; whatever impressions are 
made on the outward parts, if they 
are not taken notice of within; 
there is no perception…
So that wherever there is sense, 
or perception, there some idea is 
actually produced, and present in 
the understanding (Locke 138).
 Here, what Locke is describing 
with perception, is essentially qualia. 
Qualia fit into Locke’s theory of the 
mind and his solution to the mind-body 
problem. The senses allow perception 
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(which also requires consciousness) to 
lead to ideas, and by extension qualia. 
 We can see from Locke’s 
“An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding” that he is a dualist, 
and this makes the mind-body 
problem a constant factor in terms 
of understanding qualia. Until Locke, 
the interaction between the mind and 
the external world was chalked up to 
God. This classical cause is especially 
embedded in Berkeley’s understanding 
of the mind-body problem. 
 Experience ties directly into 
perception in Locke’s philosophy; 
the senses and perception aspects 
of experience. For, our senses garner 
experience from which we formulate 
ideas and perceive the world (i.e. the 
blind man example). It is only through 
experience that we can come to know 
certain things about our external 
world. For example, just by looking 
at a soft cat one cannot know how its 
coat feels to the touch. Likewise, we 
can never know what it feels like to 
another person. They may agree that it 
is soft, but is their concept of soft the 
same as another person’s soft? We will 
never know, since we are so beholden 
to our singular perception. Locke takes 
this into account with his concept of 
perception and experience. 
 A problem arises from Locke’s 
idea that the senses are our sole base 
for knowledge. With Locke, because we 
are locked so completely into our own 
little perception viewpoint, the more 
experiences we can gather, from the 
most senses, the greater the amount of 
ideas and knowledge we gain. However, 
reasonable people would not agree 
that a deaf or blind person is any less 
knowledgeable than someone who has 
hearing or sight. Afterall, compared to 
the mantis shrimp, we are blind; and 
compared to a dog we are essentially 
deaf. But, we would not say they are 
more knowledgeable than we are. 
Likewise, a person with sight would not 
have a much greater understanding of 
what someone else sees than a blind 
person would have of someone who 
can see. Since, we cannot really begin to 
understand another person’s perception 
of the world, we are greatly limited to 
cross referencing any data we have 
about the external world. Furthermore, 
with the explanatory gap, it would seem 
that even with identical experiences 
two people may not have the same 
“knowledge”.  
 However, Frédérique de 
Vignemont’s writings about the mind-
body problem, would show how 
the senses can be overridden and 
qualia can be based off of “unfactual” 
information. She points to the rubber 
hand hypothesis, which demonstrates 
how “the spatial content of bodily 
experiences is shaped by the body map 
which can be distorted and includes 
extraneous objects” (Vignemont 89). In 
the rubber hand experiment, subjects 
experience a rubber arm as their own, 
despite having no feeling in the foreign 
object, they can feel sensations and 
react when the arm is threatened.  But 
does this then make that quale “false” in 
some sense? Or is it just as real as qualia 
that come from senses as typically 
experienced? These are just a few of the 
questions that surround qualia.
 Would language then be our 
main mode for knowledge? Following 
the assertion that people lacking a sense 
are no more or less knowledgeable than 
people with the standard faculties 
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in terms of cognition. Regardless 
of our sensory input, we are able to 
conceive abstract ideas and reason 
even with extremely limited sensory 
input. Furthermore, with our senses 
susceptible, qualia become extremely 
subjective. Berkeley would vehemently 
deny this, as he sees language as an 
inhibitor for understanding. 
 Simone de Beauvoir deals 
with the mind-body debate as well. In 
her The Second Sex, she rejects the idea 
that females are inferior to males based 
on biology. She says “the body is the 
instrument of our hold on the world, the 
world appears different to us depending 
on how it is grasped” (66). Here we see 
that the mind-body interaction directly 
impacts qualia. For our experience 
is based on how our bodies interact 
with the world. However, her framing 
includes society, which is not a 
component in this paper.
 Regardless, for Berkeley, the 
mind-body problem is resolved; only 
the mind exists and the senses and 
body muddle our perception and 
understanding of the nature of reality. 
But, for Locke and others the issue is 
still alive and well. We have given a 
general overview of what qualia are, 
and how it relates to the mind-body 
problem. Consciousness is a necessary 
condition for qualia, but, it seems, so 
are the senses. As we have seen, many 
philosophers have argued about what 
the senses and consciousness means 
for our understanding of the world. 
Materialists attempt to reduce mental 
phenomena to a material cause, 
while idealists argue that material is 
dependant on the mind. Meanwhile, 
dualists accept both the material and 
immaterial and are faced with uniting 
the two. With the identification of 
qualia, this exchange has only gotten 
deeper. Due to qualia’s immaterial 
nature and its dependance on sensory 
input, it has caused issues for both 
materialism and idealism. Dualism, on 
the other hand, is not contradicted by 
qualia. Throughout this paper, we have 
found that the combination of qualia’s 
ineffable quality and the explanatory 
gap indicates that our experiences are 
inherently imbued with subjectivity 
through qualia. With qualia collapsing 
into our experiences, it may be near 
impossible to separate the qualia from 
subjective experience itself. This makes 
it even more imperative to continue to 
explore the concept of qualia, which can 
only yield a better understanding of our 
perception of the world. 
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